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INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITION TO

REGULATE CORPORATIONS: A
COMMENT ON MACEY
Jill E. Fischt

INTRODUCTION

It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to comment on Professor
Macey's paper. My remarks focus on an earlier draft of Professor
Macey's paper and his oral remarks.' Professor Macey makes two
basic points. First, he observes that crisis leads to regulatory change
and identifies the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20022 as Congress' regulatory response to the recent corporate governance scandals. Second,
he describes a type of competition among regulators in responding to
the scandals, noting in particular the emergence of New York State
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer as a key player in initiating enforcement activity. On this latter point, he predicts that the federal government will ultimately eliminate the ability of state regulators such
as Spitzer to play a major role in corporate governance or securities
regulation. Ultimately, the theme that encompasses both Professor
Macey's oral remarks and the final version of his and Professor
O'Hara's
paper,
is
one
of
comparative
institutional
competence-identifying the institution best able to regulate corporate governance in today's world.

t Alpin J. Cameron Professor of Law and Director, Center for Corporate, Securities &
Financial Law, Fordham Law School. Copyright 2005 Jill Fisch.
I Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Governance: The Coming Pre-emption of the Martin Act, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 587 (2005).
This commentary is based on that presentation, and not on the final paper that he has published
as part of this volume.
2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
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I. CRISIS GENERATES REGULATORY CHANGE

On the first point, Professor Macey is of course absolutely
right-crisis does lead to regulation. Crisis is a particularly important
factor in generating regulatory change with respect to business law.
The clearest example we have of that is the stock market crash of
1929, which led Congress to enact the federal securities laws, the
starting point of regulatory competition between the states and the
federal government. Prior to the adoption of the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the states regulated
corporations through state corporation laws and blue sky laws, and
the stock exchanges regulated corporations through listing standards.
The creation of the SEC itself is a byproduct of the federal securities laws. Congress specifically explained when it passed the federal
securities laws that it was responding to national emergencies like the
stock market crash and the Great Depression, and the burdens that
these events put on the public, on the market, on the federal government. and so forth.3 More recent regulatory responses to crisis have
included the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, adopted after investigations revealed widespread use of bribes by U.S. corporations operating overseas, 4 and the proliferation of state anti-takeover laws adopted
5
in response to the growth in hostile tender offers in the 1980s.
Why is crisis a substantial factor in producing regulatory change?
One reason is that, from a public choice perspective, business is usually in a pretty good position to resist substantial new regulation.
Crisis, at least in the short-term, upsets that balance. Corporate governance scandals-accounting, insider trading, excessive executive
compensation packages-give business lobbyists a little less credibility. Crisis empowers members of the public that typically do not have
significant political power. Crisis brings people with diverse interests
together into interest groups. And, of course, crisis increases the political saliency of the regulatory issues involved-a factor that is par-

3 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (2000). As Congress
stated in adopting the Act:
National Emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the dislocation
of trade, transportation, and industry, and which burden interstate commerce and adversely affect the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified, and prolonged by
manipulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices and by excessive speculation on such exchanges and markets, and to meet such emergencies
the Federal Government is put to such great expense as to burden the national credit.
ld.
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)-(3), 78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78ff (2000).
5 See William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715

(1998) (describing timing and process by which states adopted antitakeover legislation).
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ticularly important in that many issues involving business regulation
generally have low political saliency.
If you look at the debate in Congress, leading up to the adoption of
Sarbanes-Oxley, you see that the corporate governance crises had the
effect of changing the different political dynamic. Professor Macey
does not draw a particular normative conclusion about this change.
Many corporate executives have criticized Sarbanes-Oxley as an
overreaction-imposing substantial compliance costs on the vast majority of law-abiding corporations based on the wrongdoing of a few
bad apples. Other commentators argue that self-dealing by corporate
executives was widespread and that regulatory reforms were long
overdue. In evaluating the consequences of regulatory reforms that
respond to crises, one interesting question is whether the effect of
those reforms will outlast public memory of the crises that generated
them.
The recent corporate governance scandals did more than motivate
regulatory reform; they shifted institutional participation in the regulatory process. Congress has taken a more significant role, removing
certain corporate governance issues from state regulation and mandating specific governance initiatives by the SEC and the self regulatory
organizations (SROs). At the same time, state regulators, particularly
Attorney General Spitzer, have initiated enforcement actions with
respect to securities issues that have typically been left to the SEC. It
is this shift, and its effect on institutional competition, to which I turn
in Part II.
II. COMPETITION AMONG REGULATORS

Competition among regulators is an ongoing theme in corporate
law. Since the adoption of the federal securities laws in the 1930s,
the federal government and the states have shared the responsibility
for regulating corporations. Well before the 1930s, the states competed with each other for regulatory authority through the mechanism
of charter competition. New Jersey was the early leader in that competition, but was subsequently displaced by Delaware. Delaware remains the dominant supplier of state corporate law to date, despite
some efforts by states such as Nevada to attract charter business away
from Delaware.
Thus, institutional competition to regulate corporations is not a
new theme. Mark Roe has written about the delicate balance between
federal level regulation, by the SEC and Congress, and state regula-
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tion. Roe argues that, because Congress has the power to preempt
state level regulation, Congress can effectively compete with the
states even without formal legislation, because the prospect of such
legislation constrains state regulatory discretion. Essentially, as Roe
explains, Delaware and other states cannot depart too far from the
federal ideal, or Congress will push back.
The Spitzer investigations and enforcement actions represent the
opposite side of Mark Roe's analysis-the push back from the states
in response to perceived inadequacies in federal enforcement activity
with respect to misconduct typically regulated by the SEC and the
SROs. First, Spitzer investigated conflicts of interest among research
analysts, uncovering extensive problems among large Wall Street
Investment Banks and ultimately engineering a $1.4 billion global
settlement with ten of the banks. 7 Subsequently Spitzer uncovered
widespread practices of late trading and market timing in the mutual
fund industry. 8 Spitzer's enforcement actions addressed issues about
which federal regulators were aware, but nevertheless had failed to
act. Indeed, at the same time that the SEC is moving to extend its
regulation of the mutual fund industry and impose some of the same
restrictions on hedge funds, Spitzer's actions suggest serious deficiencies in mutual fund regulation.
Spitzer's actions have, in turn, generated a federal pushback, although perhaps not of the type envisioned by Roe. In addition to having the effect of embarrassing federal regulators, the Spitzer investigations have been quite unpleasant for securities firms who are currently seeking to have Congress curb Spitzer's enthusiasm for cleaning up the securities markets. There is actually legislation on the table, such as H.R. 2179, the Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor
Restitution Act, that limit Spitzer's ability to compete with the SEC to
regulate misconduct in the securities industry.
Professor Macey tells this story and offers the prediction that Congress will reduce or eliminate institutional competition from state
regulators like Spitzer through legislation. The scope of current institutional competition goes quite a bit further, however. Spitzer has
also entered into a turf war with the SEC and the federal government
on the dual issues of self-regulation in the securities industry and ex6

Mark J. Roe, Delaware'sCompetition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003).

7 Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, SEC, NY At-

torney General, NASD, NASAA, NYSE and State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement to
at
Reform Investment Practices(December 20, 2002), available
2
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/dec/dec2ObO .htrll.
8 Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, State Investigation Reveals Mutual Fund Fraud(September 3, 2003), availableat
3
3
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/sepO aO .htnml.
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ecutive compensation, addressing both with his litigation challenging
former NYSE CEO Richard Grasso's compensation package. 9
There are two ways to look at Spitzer's actions here. First, on the
subject of self-regulation, the New York Stock Exchange and the
NASD have traditionally had extensive regulatory authority, subject
to SEC oversight. This means that even though the big broker dealers
have extensive operations on Wall Street, and have a substantial impact on the economic condition of New York, the NYSE CEO and
Board have substantially greater regulatory power over them than
state regulators such as Spitzer. Moreover, although the SEC ostensibly supervises self-regulation, there are areas such as market regulation in which that supervision has been extremely light.10 Spitzer's
lawsuit can be seen as a reassertion of authority over a key New York
State industry. Indeed, although Grasso argued that a federal court
should hear the case because of the SEC's role overseeing the stock
exchange, that argument was rejected by a federal judge who sent the
case back to state court."
Alternatively, by challenging Grasso's pay package, Spitzer may
be trying to stake out a role in regulating executive compensation.
Although the regulation of executive compensation is traditionally
considered a component of state corporate law, most of the major
regulatory initiatives have occurred at the federal level.1 2 The SEC
has sought to address excessive executive compensation through disclosure requirements. Similarly, Congress has restricted the amount
and form of executive compensation through provisions in the internal revenue code. These regulatory efforts have been widely criticized as ineffective; indeed, some commentators argue that these efforts have exacerbated the problem.' 3 Grasso has responded through

9 See Complaint, People v. Grasso (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed May 24, 2004), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/may/may24a_04_attach.pdf.
10See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failureof
the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 315 (1985) (arguing that SEC has failed
to take significant steps to deregulate the securities markets despite an explicit congressional
mandate that it do so).
I Associated Press, Update 4: Grasso Lawsuit Sent to State Court, Dec. 10, 2004, available at http://www.forbes.comassociatedpress/feeds/ap/2004/12/10/apl703935.html.
Federal
District Court Judge Gerald Lynch held that "[plermitting a state government to enforce the
corporate governance norms under which an exchange or self-regulating organization is established violates no policy embodied in the federal securities laws." Id.
12 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, 34 GA. L. REV. 745, 761-63 (2000) (describing federal and state regulation of executive
compensation).
13E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary, Stakeholder Values, Disclosure, and Materiality, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 96-97 (1998).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:3

route, using an obscure provision of state not-for-profit
a different
4
law.'
The Grasso litigation is another example of the kind of dynamic
that Professor Macey is talking about-institutional competition
among regulators to address corporate governance issues. Arguably
both SRO supervision and executive compensation are areas in which
one could criticize the level of SEC enforcement activity, and
Spitzer's lawsuits represent exactly that type of challenge.
The state level pushback extends beyond Attorney General Spitzer.
On the specific subject of executive compensation, we see a response
by the Delaware courts in the Disney case. 15 After years of giving
limited scrutiny to claims that executive compensation is excessive,
courts in Delaware have seized upon the duty of good faith as a potential mechanism for increasing their oversight of the compensation
process.
A broader example is in the area of securities litigation. Over the
past ten years, Congress has taken securities litigation away from the
states, largely in response to claims of excessive or frivolous litigation. 16 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") imposed a heightened pleading standard and other substantive and pro-17
fraud.
cedural barriers to private civil claims for federal securities
When investors sought to bypass the restrictions of the PSLRA by
litigating in state court, Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, which preempted most state court claims for
securities fraud.' 8 At the same time, commentators have argued that
federal securities litigation has developed into the primary mechanism
for regulating corporate governance. 19
Now states are pushing back against the federalization of securities
fraud. We see an increasing use by plaintiffs of state "holders" litigation, in which plaintiffs recast their claims as breaches of fiduciary
duty and then, relying on a narrow carve-out in the PSLRA, bring

14 N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT-CORP. LAW § 202(a)(12) (McKinney 1998). This section authorizes non-profit corporations to pay only "reasonable compensation" that is "commensurate
with services performed."
15 In re Wait Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
16See Jill E. Fisch, The Scope of PrivateSecurities Litigation: In Search of LiabilityStandardsfor Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1293, 1305 (1999) (describing the evolution away from States' securities litigation power).
17 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1998)).
18 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. ).
19 Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections upon Federalism,56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860-61 (2003).
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those claims in state court.20 "Holders" litigation offers a mechanism
for recapturing some control over corporate governance at the state
level in state courts.
III.

PUBLIC CHOICE AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE

Professor Macey goes on to evaluate this institutional competition,
relying heavily on a public choice analysis of the SEC. He has, of
course, written extensively in this area,21 and as he sees it, institutional competition is largely about interest groups and rent seeking.
With respect to the SEC, Professor Macey is particularly concerned
about agency capture. He identifies the revolving door between the
SEC and the securities industry. Potentially more significant is the
role of the powerful investment banks. Corporate America has typically been very successful in constraining SEC regulatory initiatives.
The Business Roundtable successfully litigated to overturn the SEC's
one share, one vote rule.22 The Chamber of Commerce is challenging
the SEC's independence requirements for mutual fund boards. 23 Corporate opposition has, to date, blocked the SEC's proposal to allow
direct shareholder nomination of directors. Similarly, with respect to
analyst conflicts of interest, mutual fund trading practices, and so
forth, Professor Macey identifies the risk that the SEC's views will be
dominated by the powerful investment bank interest group. He concludes from this that, in the long run, Spitzer's enforcement efforts
are doomed. They are doomed because they represent state intrusions
into the SEC's turf, a turf on which investment banks have traditionally been better protected from aggressive regulation.
But the story is a bit more complex. First, from an interest group
perspective, it is a mistake to focus exclusively on investment banks.
The key factor in the current regulatory environment is that the corporate governance scandals have destabilized the political dynamic,
increasing the power of a variety of other interest groups, including
shareholders, corporations, trial lawyers, and employees. A prime
20 See, e.g., Small v Fritz Cos., 65 P.3d 1255 (Cal. 2003) (recognizing a state law claim
for "holders" of securities who were induced not to trade because of alleged fraud).
21 E.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory
Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 242-44 (1986) (describing
how the public can control special interest legislation through institutional mechanisms such as
constitutions); Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of
Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 43, 45-47 (1988) (describing an economic theory of
legislation in which "politicians maximize the aggregate political support they receive from all
interest groups").
22 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
23 See Andrew Countryman, Mutual Fund Independence Regulation Challenged, CH.
TRIB., Sept. 3, 2004, at I (describing the litigation).
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example is the way in which employee pension losses in Enron has
caused a dramatic re-evaluation of the fiduciary obligations of pension fund managers.
If the political arena functions more or less as market, the empowerment of other interest groups increases the competition for political
advantage. Some of the groups that have taken a heightened interest
in corporate governance are groups that already enjoy a significant
amount of political influence, such as the AARP and labor union pension funds. Their empowerment and attention should reduce the ability of investment banks to use their political power to generate or
maintain rents.
Second, and this relates to the previous discussion of institutional
competition, the effect of interest group competition must also be
evaluated on a comparative basis. In particular, one has to question
whether state regulators can conceivably pose a meaningful threat in
the long run, considering the political power of the investment banking and U.S. business interests. It should virtually always be easier
for an industry, such as the financial services industry, to capture the
state level of regulation than to capture the Congress and the SEC.
We saw an example of this with respect to state anti-takeover regulation. Although corporate interest groups pushed hard in Congress
for federal legislation restricting hostile takeovers, they were largely
unsuccessful. In contrast, state legislatures passed extensive antitakeover regulation. 24 Indeed, Ohio has some notable and distinctive
statutory anti-takeover provisions, including an explicit rejection of
Delaware's heightened standard of review for management defensive
actions.25
Similarly, the financial services industry must have considerably
more political power in New York State than in Congress where other
competing interest groups have a fair amount of political capital. As
Spitzer prepares to run for governor, he will also be increasingly
aware of the economic power of the Wall Street banks. As with takeovers, a congressional response to state regulation is likely to be more
costly from a public choice perspective than state level action.
On the normative side, the question that Professor Macey's public
choice analysis puts on the table is the question of comparative institutional competence. From a normative perspective, who is the right
regulator? Will Congress, the SEC, the SROs, or the states do the
best job in improving corporate governance and reducing the potential
for future misconduct? Of course, this question requires us to make
24 See Carney, supra note 5.
25 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(C) (2004).
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some hard decisions, both about our objectives and about the most
suitable method of achieving those objectives.
On the goal
side-should regulators place the greatest emphasis on efficiency, on
uniformity, on freedom of contract, on the protection of small investors, or something else? On the methodology side, how are these
goals best obtained? The SEC has traditionally emphasized transparency and disclosure. State courts, particularly the Delaware courts,
have focused on process and independence. The SROs, especially the
New York Stock Exchange, pay the most attention to market structure. In Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress places a premium on financial
accounting.
These institutional differences highlight an additional benefit of
institutional competition-specialization. The presence of multiple
regulators creates a broader scope of regulation while maintaining the
high level of expertise required by the capital markets. Indeed, the
very dispersion of regulatory responses to the corporate governance
scandals offers a powerful reason to reject the search for the ideal
institution to anoint as the dominant regulator. Only time will allow
us to identify which institution has responded most effectively, but by
maintaining regulatory competition, we increase the likelihood of an
effective response.
CONCLUSION

In examining the varied regulatory responses to the corporate governance scandals and, in particular, the turf war between Attorney
General Spitzer and the SEC, Professor Macey focuses on institutional choice. For him, the scandals highlight questions about the
SEC's vulnerabilities as a regulator and suggest that, because those
vulnerabilities are the product of interest group influence, they are
likely to dominate the temporary political instability generated by the
recent crisis.
This comment suggests that crises create instability not just within
interest group competition but within the balance of authority among
competing institutional regulators. In business regulation, this instability is particularly effective in overcoming a substantial status quo
bias. The resulting regulatory competition offers valuable experimentation and innovation with respect to potential regulatory solutions
and, ultimately, a powerful defense to the broad allocation of regulatory authority among competing institutions such as Congress, the
SEC, the NYSE, and the states.

